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I. Introduction
For several years, space transportation system and architecture (the 
total set of space transportation launch and support systems) studies have 
been underway having as a principal focus a substantial reduction in recurring 
and life cycle costs. Cost reductions are essential if the nation is to 
economically handle the substantially increased space traffic levels projected 
for the mid-1990s and beyond. However, in the aftermath of the Challenger 
tragedy it became apparent that there was another factor which also needed 
emphasis — that of architecture and system resiliency, the ability to readily 
recover from misfortune. The long post-failure standdown time which the 
Shuttle has experienced clearly illustrates the implications of a lack of 
resiliency. Among these are: severe schedule delays; an inability to fly 
critical or time-dependent payloads; and substantial costs imposed on all 
programs for payload storage and maintenance, facilities maintenance, reduced 
productivity, and personnel.
In the fall of 1986, studies were initiated at The Aerospace 
Corporation on the issue of space transportation architecture and systems 
resiliency. The objectives were fourfold, namely:
o to define a systematic approach for quantitatively analyzing
systems/architecture resiliency 
o to identify those parameters which determine resiliency and to
understand their quantitative interaction 
o to evaluate the resiliency of the presently-planned U. S. space
transportation architecture in the context of projected national
space traffic 
o to identify means for improving resiliency.
The fundamental analysis effort was completed by March 1987. Since then, the 
work, has been presented to high levels within the Air Force, NASA, and SDIO 
communities, as well as to other government organizations concerned with U. S. 
space program activities. This paper documents the substance of those 
presentations.
Before commencing with a discussion of the analytical work, it is noted 
that from the outset it was recognized that the analysis was not only dealing 
with resiliency, but rather with the more general subject of operability. 
Operability includes several factors:
o resiliency — the ability to readily recover from misfortune
o availability — the fraction of time that a system is in an
operational, rather than a post-failure standdown state 
o reliability — the probability that a launch system will fulfill
its cargo delivery mission without any standdown-causing failures 
o dependability — the ability of an operational launch system to
maintain flight schedules.
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The first three operability factors are closely related. The fourth 
factor, dependability, is more a function of the ability to realize small 
uncertainties in ground operations timelines and to have a system with broad 
weather operating envelopes. The issue of how to achieve high dependability 
is being pursued in other activities, and will not be discussed further.
II. Analytical Model & Parametrics
When a launch system experiences an in-flight failure, there is 
generally a post-failure standdown period sufficiently long to allow for 
failure diagnosis, the implementation of any needed design or procedural 
changes, and validation of changes through appropriate analysis and/or 
testing. Subsequently, a period of increased launch rate (surge) would be 
needed if a payload backlog has accumulated during the standdown and is to be 
eliminated. During this surge period, payloads from the standdown period 
would be sequenced with new payloads in a priority order. Upon backlog 
elimination, the launch system would return to its prefailure (normal) launch 
rate. This sequence of events comprises the analytical model for the 
resiliency analysis (see Figure 1).
The duration of the surge period is a function of the post-failure 
standdown time, the surge launch rate, and the fraction of payloads originally 
scheduled to be flown during the standdown interval which constitute the 
payload backlog. The number of launches involved in the surge period is 
dependent upon these parameters as well as the pre-failure (normal) launch 
rate. For very short standdown times, all originally planned payloads would 
probably still be flown; a backlog fraction of approximately 1.0. For longer 
standdown times, it is likely that the backlog fraction would decrease as 
launch windows are missed, needs for time-dependent missions are negated, and 
payload programs and budgets are redefined.
There are very limited data, stemming principally from the 
post-Challenger situation, upon which to base the backlog fraction parameter. 
An examination of pre-Challenger and post-Challenger manifests planned for 
U.S. launch systems was conducted at a time when the Shuttle standdown was 
being projected to be about 24 months. Some of the payloads eliminated from 
the manifests were not very firm payloads, and others were eliminated due to 
programmatic changes seemingly independent of the Shuttle standdown. However, 
a substantial number were apparently eliminated because of the lengthy 
anticipated Shuttle standdown. Based upon this analysis, a payload backlog 
fraction decrease of 0.167 per year of standdown time was assumed.
Using the analytical model, a quantitative resiliency parameter has 
been defined, namely the probability that a launch system can recover from the 
effects of a failure, including backlog elimination, before suffering another 
failure (i.e. the probability of proceeding through the surge period without 
any failures). It is a function of the number of launches involved in the 
surge and the probability of a successful flight (without any failure which 
would cause a standdown), the launch system's reliability.
The equation for the resiliency parameter is:
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where PS = probability of no failures during surge period 
r = launch system's reliability 
N = numbers of launches during surge period 
R = normal (pre-failure) launch rate, ///year 
Tj) = launch system's characteristic post-failure standdown time,
years
K = backlog fraction
S = launch rate surge factor (i.e. surge launch rate divided by 
normal launch rate)
Obviously, a high value of Ps , the resiliency parameter, would be 
desirable. The issue is: "What value of Ps would represent an acceptable 
resiliency criterion, or, equivalently, what probability of one-or-more 
failures, PF = 1 -Ps , would be tolerable?" To answer this, the 
implications of a surge period failure need be understood.
If a (second) failure occurred during the more densely trafficked surge 
period, there would be a greater backlog created by the ensuing standdown. 
The subsequent surge period would be longer in duration than the original 
surge period would have been (if completed) because of the bigger backlog, and 
would involve more launches. The probability of a failure during the new surge 
period would be even greater than during the original surge period.
To provide high confidence that a launch system could reachieve a 
normal situation within a reasonable time frame, the resiliency analysis set 
as a criterion that given a failure during the first surge period, there would 
be at least a 0.5 probability of no failures during the second surge period. 
This requires a success probability, Pg of at least 0.65 during the original 
surge period, or a failure probability, Pp, of no more than 0.35. From the 
form of the resiliency parameter equation, higher values of P§ may be 
achieved by increasing reliability, decreasing post-failure standdown times, 
increasing the launch system's surge capability, or decreasing the normal 
launch rate. For given levels of reliability, standdown time, and surge 
capability the attainment of a desired value of Ps would require a 
limitation of the normal launch rate, R.
Before illustrating the influences of the various resiliency 
determinants, attention will be given to the matter of launch system 
availability. Figure 2 illustrates the effects of changing system reliability 
on system availability and other operating parameters. In the uppermost line 
of Figure 2, the post-failure scenario is depicted with a next failure 
presumed to occur after the average number of flights between failures 
(1/1-r). Note that the operational part of the cycle between failures is made 
up of a surge period and a normal launch rate period. The launch system 
operational availability is defined as the operational time divided by the 
total cycle time (i.e. sum of the operational and standdown times).
In the second line of Figure 2, a launch system having a somewhat lower 
reliability is presumed. Its second failure occurs, on average, after a fewer 
number of flights with the result being a lower operational availability and a 
higher percentage of the operational time spent in surge. A still lower 
reliability (third line of Figure 2) could cause failures to occur (on 
average) just at the end of the surge period. In such a situation, the system 
would always be surging to keep up with demand, a poor way to operate any 
system. Any lesser reliability would not allow the launch system to keep up 
with demand.
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Figure 3 illustrates launch system availability and resiliency 
relationships, assuming a system with a characteristic post-failure standdown 
time of 6 months and a launch rate surge capability of 1.5. For a given 
annual launch rate, as reliability decreases availability decreases and 
ultimately, if reliability gets sufficiently low, the cross-hatched line is 
reached at which the system would be always in a surge condition. Below that 
line the system could not handle the demand. Along that line, there is a 64% 
chance of having a surge period failure, clearly well in excess of the 
criterion for resiliency (35% or less).
The dashed line in Figure 3 is the locus of points which just meet the 
resiliency criterion (P$ = 0.65; Pp = 0.35). This line falls about 
halfway (on the availability scale) between the cross-hatched barrier and 
perfection (i.e. reliability = 1.0, availability = 1.0). Along the Pp = 
0.35 line, operational availability is approximately 0.85 for the particular 
standdown and surge parameters assumed. A system which achieves resiliency 
with reasonable surge rates is inherently an available system.
Figure 4 depicts allowable annual launch rates, R, if systems are to 
just meet the resiliency criterion of Pp = 0.35, PS = 0.65. Two graphs 
are presented: the left hand one for a surge factor of 1.25, and the right 
hand one for a surge factor of 1.50. It may be seen that an increase from 
1.25 to 1.5 in the surge factor could allow a 66% increase in launch rate. 
(Surge capabilities much beyond about 50% might be difficult to achieve 
because of practical facility and personnel limits). A decrease in standdown 
time from 6 months to 3 months could allow an increase in launch rate of 
almost 100%. However, unless there is a willingness, perhaps imprudent, to 
count on realizing very high reliabilities and very short standdown times, 
Figure 4 would indicate an incompatibility between resiliency and very high 
use rates for a single launch system.
Launch rate surge capability is a necessary ingredient for resiliency. 
However, surge capability is perhaps a misnomer, for surge implies a 
short-lived action. Quite to the contrary, a launch system's post-standdown 
surge period would be quite lengthy (e.g. 1 1/2 years for a 6-month standdown 
and a surge capability of 1.33). This must be recognized in defining a system 
configuration, including its facilities and personnel requirements.
Achieving a surge capability involves some different considerations 
depending upon whether a launch system involves an expendable vehicle or a 
vehicle having major reusable elements (e.g. the Shuttle orbiter). With 
expendable vehicles, production generally continues during a post-failure 
standdown period, with the vehicles being accumulated for the surge. Surge 
capabilities are a function of processing/launch facilities, ground operations 
concepts, and personnel levels.
In a system involving vehicles having a major reusable element(s), the 
maximum launch rate attainable is also a function of the number of reusable 
elements available and the maximum number of times per year that each may be 
flown. Therefore, if a system involving reusable elements is to be capable of 
surging, each reusable element must be utilized at less than its allowable 
utilization rate) during normal operations. As can be seen in Figure 5, the 
extent of this underutilization must be larger if it is expected that a 
replacement reusable element(s) will not be available at commencement of surge 
operations. If a replacement vehicle is assumed to be available, the 
pre-failure capacity utilization fraction is simply 1/S, or 0.67 for a 50%
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surge capability (i.e. if a simple reusable vehicle can be used six times per 
year maximum, then its normally planned utilization should be only four times 
per year to provide a reserve for achieving a 50% surge). If a replacement 
vehicle were not to be available, than the required pre-failure utilization 
rate of each reusable vehicle should be further limited to permit the same 
surge capability with one less vehicle in the fleet. These considerations 
very significantly affect on the economics of reusable vehicles for cargo 
transport.
There is a special case when no surge is needed because there is no 
backlog resulting from a post-failure standdown. This situation could arise 
if, for example, the launch system was used only for space station crew 
rotation, because a higher rotation frequency would not be required after a 
standdown. With no surge requirement, the resiliency parameter does not 
apply, though system availability is still important. Figure 6 plots 
availability for the no backlog, no surge case as a function of system 
reliability, characteristic post-failure standdown time, and launch rate. 
Again it can be observed that maintaining good availability at high launch 
rates requires an appropriate combination of high reliability and low 
post-failure standdown times.
III. Resiliency Analysis of U.S. Space Transportation Architecture
If a space transportation architecture is to have good resiliency 
characteristics, then so must each of its component launch systems. This 
means that each launch system must be operated at a rate no higher than can be 
justified (using the resiliency criterion, or availability for the special 
case) by its reliability, characteristic post-failure standdown time, and 
surge capability. However, this implies that a specific set of launch systems 
can only accommodate a limited total mass rate to orbit. As a result, there 
is a question of how the present U.S. space transportation architecture 
(Shuttle, Titan IV, Delta II, and Titan II) measures up on a resiliency basis 
considering possible future space traffic demands.
To address this question, the present architecture was first examined 
in the context of the budget constrained national mission model used in the 
recent DoD/NASA Space Transportation Architecture Study. This mission model, 
summarized in Figure 7 predicates a mass rate to low earth orbit (due east 
equivalents) in the post-1995 time period of approximately 1,000,000 pounds 
per year, including tha weight of upper stages for those payloads having 
destinations beyond low earth orbit. Figure 7 also delineates a 
representative manifest for handling this traffic, namely 12 Shuttle, 8 Titan
IV, 14 Delta II and 3 Titan II flights per year.
To analyze the architecture resiliency, values must be assigned for the 
reliability and post-failure standdown times of each component system. Figure 
8 presents reliability and downtime histories for various contemporary launch 
systems. A quick perusal indicates that, with the exception of Scout and 
Ariane, the reliability of contemporary expendables is about 94 to 95 
percent. For the resiliency analysis, values of 96% will be used for Delta II 
and Titan IV, reflecting some assumed growth in reliability from their 
forerunners. For the Shuttle, the demonstrated reliability of 0.96 is not 
statistically meaningful since the cause of the Challenger failure has been 
attributed to a design deficiency aggregated by the decision to launch^during 
extremely cold weather. For the resiliency analysis, Shuttle will be assumed 
to have at least a 98% reliability.
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Standdown time experience for contemporary vehicles is also presented, 
in Figure 8. For the expendables, average standdown times range from slightly 
under 3 to slightly over 5 months (6.3 months if the latest Titan standdown is 
added to the data). The average standdown time seems to grow with increasing 
vehicle size. This could be due to a number of things; e.g. the higher value 
of payloads launched aboard the larger vehicles requiring additional 
confidence before resumption of operations, or larger vehicles involving more 
diagnostics, redesign and retest .complexity. Alternatively, the downtime 
differences, may not be size related but due to operating procedure/decision 
criteria differences between operating agencies (DoD, NASA). For the 
resiliency analysis characteristic standdown times of 4 months and 6 months 
were assumed for Delta II and Titan IV, respectively.
For Shuttle, the present 30-plus month standdown was not considered 
characteristic due to the nature of the failure which caused the Challenger 
loss. A range of 12 to 18 months for the characteristic standdown time was 
examined for Shuttle. The chbice of these standdown times reflects a belief 
that characteristic standdown times will be longer for vehicles having major 
reusable elements, be they manned or unmanned vehicles, than for expendables. 
This is because of the value of such vehicles and the fact that reusable 
vehicle fleet sites are small. Great confidence in the probability of success 
is generally required to risk the launch of a reusable vehicle.
With reliability and standdown times assigned, the resiliency parameter 
(the probability of failure during a surge period following a post-failure 
standdown) was calculated for each vehicle in the architecture. The results 
are presented in Figure 9. Calculations were performed for two different 
values of surge capability, except in the case of Shuttle where computations 
were done only for a surge factor of 1.25. As indicated in the figure, a 
surge factor of 1.5 for Shuttle over a flight rate of 12 per year would 
require a pre-failure fleet size of 6 Orbiters, assuming a replacement vehicle 
was not available at surge commencement following a failure — such a fleet 
size is not contemplated for Shuttle.
The data in Figure 9 indicate that, with the exception of Titan II 
operating at a low launch rate of 3 per year, all of the vehicles fail to meet 
the resiliency criterion of Pp equal to or less than 0.35. In some cases 
the Pp values are within 0.1 of the criterion value. However in other 
cases, (e.g. the Shuttle with 0.98 reliability) the Pp values are very much 
too high, sometimes equaling or exceeding the Pp value of approximately 0.64 
at which a system would always be surging and just barely able to meet 
demand. In summary, the four vehicle architecture is inadequate for handling 
the budget constrained mission model traffic since required vehicle launch 
rates would be too high to provide good operability (resiliency/availability) .
The most pronounced problem seems to be with the Shuttle, since a 
flight rate of 12 per year would require v the assumption of either very high 
reliability (greater than 0.99) or shorter standdown times. To bank on these 
might be imprudent since excessive aggregate standdowns times and backlog 
buildups could result if the expectations are unrealized. Current national 
policy is emphasizing Shuttle use only for missions requiring the transport of 
man or man's involvement in on-orbit payload operations other than just 
deployment. This could bring Shuttle flight rates down to more acceptable 
values.
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However, just offloading Shuttle is not a satisfactory solution, 
because the additional traffic cannot be handled by the other vehicles. The 
data of Figure 9 shows that the assumed Titan IV and Delta II flight rates are 
already marginal from a resiliency perspective. The Titan II payload 
capability is too small to offer any significant help in shuttle offloading. 
Therefore the only solution appeared to be to add another vehicle to the 
architecture. A heavylift launch vehicle (HLLV) was assumed as the new 
vehicle with a payload capability of 100,000 pounds, considered necessary to 
accommodate the mission model traffic rate without too high a flight rate.
Figure 10 presents the results of the resiliency analysis for the new 
5-vehicle architecture. For this case, the Shuttle, Titan IV and Delta II 
flight rates were lowered to 8, 5 and 8, respectively, and supplemented with 5 
flights per year of the new heavylift vehicle. If a surge capability of 1.5 
is assumed, each of the vehicles can readily handle its traffic load while 
meeting the resiliency criterion (except for the pessimistic case where 0.98 
and 18 months were assumed for the Shuttle reliability and characteristic 
standdown time, respectively). If the lower Shuttle flight rate reflected its 
utilization only for manned transport (e.g. space station crew rotation), 
then, as previously discussed, Shuttle could require no post-standdown surge. 
This possible situation has been analyzed, and the results are presented in 
Figure 11. The resiliency parameters (Pp), shown only for the expendables 
in this figure, are the same as those in Figure 10. Availability numbers are, 
however, presented for all of the systems in Figure 11. With the exception of 
a Shuttle with an assumed reliability of 0.98, all of the availability numbers 
are 0.9 or better.
In summary, the 5-vehicle architecture with a new heavylift vehicle 
appears more than capable of handling the budget constrained mission model. 
This is fortunate since growth in the mission model (still not assuming an SDI 
deployment or major new civil space initiatives) might be the case as was 
postulated in the recent DoD/NASA Space Transportation Architecture Study 
(STAS). An analysis of the incremental traffic associated with the STAS 
growth model indicates that its principal impact would be an increase in the 
HLLV flight rate. Approximately 12 additional HLLV flights would be required 
(for a total of 17), depending on realistically realizable load factors. To 
accommodate this, the HLLV reliability would have to* be somewhat over 0.98. A 
reduction in the HLLV standdown time from the assumed value of 6 months could 
permit somewhat higher flight rates.
Figure 12 introduces a note of caution against very optimistic 
expectations of high reliability (and/or low standdown times). It illustrates 
that if flight rates are set to just meet the resiliency criterion based upon 
such expectations, slight reductions in realized reliability result in rapid 
increases of the PF parameter to the point where the system could no longer 
handle the traffic demand. Exercising prudence is important in making 
reliability and standdown time projections for purposes of determining 
allowable flight rates, particularly in the initial years of a new system's 
operation until sufficient reliability data is developed.
IV. Summary
If a space transportation architecture is to have good operability 
(resiliency, availability) characteristics, then it must consist of a mixed 
fleet of independent launch systems. (An independent launch system is one 
which would not be caused to standdown due to a failure in another.) Never
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again can the Nation opt for a one-vehicle architecture, or one in which the 
vast preponderance of the traffic is assigned to one vehicle system. In such 
situations the frequency and consequences of failures (and failures will 
occur) would be intolerable, namely, too often an inability to launch, payload 
backlog buildups, and additional costs imposed on many programs because of the 
standdowns. Rather, the number of independent systems in the mixed fleet must 
be determined, and the architecture operated, such that each system is not 
used excessively in relation to its demonstrated or conservatively projected 
reliability and standdown times. Furthermore, each system used for cargo 
transport must have substantial surgie capability.
For contemporary launch systems, the resiliency analysis has 
illustrated the impracticality of trying to fly Shuttle more than about 8 
times per year in view of the projected 12 to 18 month average post-failure 
standdown times which likely will characterize that system. Similarly, the 
resiliency analysis has shown that Titan IV and Delta II utilizations should 
be limited to about 8 and 10 flights per year, respectively, assuming that 
these systems achieve only modest improvements in reliability from 
contemporary experience and comparable post-failure standdown times.
This leads to the key conclusions of the resiliency analysis, namely:
o there is a need to improve the operability of the U.S. space 
transportation architecture if we are to meet future needs; and
o to fulfill this need a new heavylift launch vehicle (HLLV) must be 
added to the architecture, its specific payload capability to be 
determined based on more precise mission requirements and cost 
analyses.
The resiliency analysis has illustrated the importance of striving for 
improved reliability and reduced standdown times in a new HLLV to facilitate 
increased launch rates, to improve economics, and to avoid the loss of costly 
critical payloads. If short standdown times (e.g. 4 to 6 months) typical of 
present expendables are projected, a HLLV reliability of approximately 0.98 (a 
factor of 2 to 3 reduction in future rates from present experience) would be 
needed to accommodate projected traffic. However, if the HLLV characteristic 
standdown time was much longer (e.g. 1 year or more), substantially higher 
reliabilities (greater than 0.99) would be needed. This would likely be the 
case with HLLVs having major reusable elements because of their complexity, 
cost, and limited numbers. A need for very high reliability is central to the 
concept of reusability not only for resiliency, but also to have a low 
probability of losing a costly reusable vehicle.
The need for a new HLLV is independent of space transportation cost 
reduction considerations. Even if costs were zero for contemporary systems, a 
new HLLV would be needed, for architecture operability (availability, 
resiliency). However, in adding a new HLLV to the U.S. space transportation 
architecture, an opportunity exists to achieve substantial cost reduction. 
But seizing upon this opportunity requires a new, revolutionary philosophy in 
which design approaches (including design and operating margins), operations 
concepts, and technology applications would be selected based on their ability 
for cost reduction rather than performance optimization. The Advanced Launch 
System (ALS), presently in a concept definition phase under joint Air Force 
and NASA program management, has adopted this cost-reduction philosophy. If 
developed, ALS could fulfill the operability-based need for a new heavylift 
launch system.
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Fig. 9. Resiliency Analysis for Constrained Mission 
Model and 4 Vehicle Architecture
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(1) Shuttle principal use for crew rotation
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